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s every lawyer knows, 
the prosecutor is the 
most powerful figure 
in the American crim- 
inal justice system. 
The prosecutor de- 
cides whom to charge, what 
charges to bring, whether to permit 
a defendant to plead guilty, and 
whether to confer immunity. In 
carrying out this broad decision- 
making power, the prosecutor en- 
joys considerable independence. 
Indeed, one of the most elusive and 
vexing subjects in criminal justice 
has been to define the limits of the 
lar-Pena, 887 F2d 347 ( I  st Cir 1989); 
United States v. White, 869 F2d 822, 
825 (5th Cir 1989).) Although they 
remove sentencing discretion from 
judges, the Guidelines tacitly shift 
much of that discretion to prose- 
cutors. Thus, the most important 
provisions that permit sentence re- 
duction below a statutorily man- 
dated minimum-18 U.S.C. § 
3553(e) and Guideline SKI .l -reo- 
ognize as a mitigating factor the de- 
fendant's efforts to assist the 
government in the investigation and 
prosecution of criniinal activities. 
18 U.S.C. 5 3553(e), entitled 
assistance rendered; 
(2) the truthfulness, com- 
pleteness, and reliability 
of any information or tes- 
timony provided by the 
defendant; 
(3) the nature and extent of 
the defendant's assist- 
ance; 
(4) any injury suffered, or any 
danger or risk of injury to 
the defendant or his family 
resulting from his assist- 
ance; and 
(5) the timeliness of the d r -  
fendant's assistance. 
prosecutor's discretion. 
This issue has recently emerged 
in a new context: the provisions in 
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines 
(the Guidelines) relating to sen- 
tence reductions based on the 
prosecutor's representation that a 
defendant has given law enforce- 
ment substantial cooperation. In 
Mistretta v. United States, 109 S Ct 
647 (1 989), the Supreme Court up- 
held the Guidelines against consti- 
tutional attacks based on separation 
of powers and delegation of au- 
thority. However, the Court was not 
asked to consider other constitu- 
tional challenges-in particular the 
claim that the Giridelines violate 
due process by de facto transfer- 
ring much of the responsibility of 
sentencing from impartial judges to 
prosecutors, without providing 
standards to guide the prosecutors' 
discretion. Indeed, according to 
one federal court, the enhanced 
prosccutorial power under this new 
sentencing regime "may be the 
most fundamental change in the 
criminal justice system to have oc- 
curred within the past generation." 
(United States v. Roberts, 726 F Supp 
1359, 1363 (DC DC 1989).) 
The Guidelines were designed to 
effectively stunt the wide discre- 
tion that district judges formerly 
enjoyed in criminal sentencing. 
(United States v. LaCuardia, 902 F2d 
1010, 101 3 (1 st Cir 1990).) Indeed, 
uniformity in the sentences im- 
posed on similar offenders co11- 
victed of like crimes was a primary 
goal of Congress in enacting the 
Gt~ideliries. (United States v. Agui- 
Fall 1990 
"Limited authority to impose a sen- 
tence below a statutory mini- 
mum," provides: 
Upon motion of the Govern- 
ment, the court shall have the 
authority to impose a sentence 
below a level established by stat- 
ute as minimum sentence so as 
to reflect a defendant's substan- 
tial assistance in the investigation 
or prosecution of another person 
who has committed an offense. 
Such sentence shall be imposed 
in accordance with the guide- 
lines and policy statements is- 
sued by the Sentencing Commis- 
sion pursuant to section 994 of 
Title 28, United States Code. 
The interpretation and applica- 
tion of these provisions raise sev- 
eral fundamental questions. First, 
by removing the court's authority 
to reduce a sentence except upon 
the prosecutor's motion, do Sec- 
tion 3553(e) and Guideline 5K1 . I  
violate due process? Second, as- 
suming the foregoing provisions are 
constitutional, does a defendant 
have any remedy when a prose- 
cutor refuses to move for a sen- 
tence reduction based on the 
defendant's claim that he or she 
gave substantial cooperation? Third, 
assuming a court is willing to en- 
tertain the application, what stan- 
dards should be applied to review 
a prosec~~tor's exeicise of discre- Section 5K1.1 of the tion in refusing to request a sen- Sentencing Guidelines, entitled 
"Substantial Assistance to Authori- tence reduction based on the defendant's purported coopera- ties (Policy Statement)," provides: tion? 
Upon motion of the governmelit 
stating that the defendant has 
provided substantial assistance in 
the investigation or prosecution 
of another person who has com- 
mitted an offense, the court may 
depart from the guidelines. 
(a) The appropriate reduction 
shall be determined by the 
court for reasons stated that 
may include, but are not lim- 
ited to, consideration of the 
following: 
( I )  the court's evaluation of 
the significance and use- 
fulness of the defendant's 
assistance, taking into con- 
sideration the govern- 
ment's evaluation of the 
Constitutionality of 5 3553(e) 
and SK1.1? 
Under the Guidelines, the pros- 
ecutor has broad power to unilat- 
erally control the amount of 
punishtnent a defendant receives. 
Under the strict language of the 
statute and Guidelines, unless the 
prosecutor initiates the process, 
neither the defendant nor the court 
can influence a sentence by show- 
ing that the defendant cooperated 
with the government. The prose- 
cutor alone is  empowered to cause 
a sentence to be adjusted below the 
mandated minimum, and the judge, 
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who historically has been the prin- 
cipal official entrusted with respon- 
sibility for sentencing, becomes 
virtually obsolete. To be sure, even 
absent a prosecution motion, the 
court is  free to consider evidence 
of a defendant's substantial assist- 
ance in determining what sentence 
within the guideline range should 
be imposed. (LaCuardia, 902 F2d at 
101 3, n 4.) Nevertheless, the pro- 
cess, so the argument goes, tips so 
one-sidedly in the prosecutor's fa- 
vor as to "disturb the due process 
balance essential to the fairness of 
criminal litigation." (Roberts, 726 F 
Supp at 1363.) 
This new sentencing regime has 
resulted from two factors. First, in 
its charging function, the prosecu- 
tion can select the precise charges 
to bring against a defendant from a 
broad arsenal of often overlapping 
criminal statutes and aggravating 
factors enumerated in the Guide- 
line provisions. For example, if a 
person is arrested in possession of 
two ounces of crack, the prosecu- 
tor may have a discretionary choice 
among the following thirteen sta- 
tutory options: simple possession 
of crack (21 USC 5 844: statutory 
punishment one year); possession 
with intent to distribute crack (21 
USC § 841(a): twenty-year maxi- 
mum); possession with intent to 
distribute 5 grams or more of crack 
(21 USC 3 841 (b)(l)(B)(iii): five-year 
mandatory minimum, which can be 
doubled at prosecutor's option if 
defendant is  charged with distri- 
bution to persons under the age of 
twenty-one, or within 1,000 feet of 
a school); possession with intent to 
distribute 50 grams or more of crack 
(21 USC § 841 (b)(l )(A)(iii): ten-year 
mandatory minimum to life); con- 
spiracy (18 USC § 371: five-year 
maximum); drug conspiracy involv- 
ing the distribution of 5 grams or 
more of crack (21 USC § 
841 (b)(l )(B)(iii): five-year manda- 
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tory minimum); drug conspiracy in- 
volving the distribution of 50 grams 
or more of crack (21 USC 53 
841 (b)(l )(A)(iii) and 846: ten-year 
mandatory minimum to life); en- 
gaging in a pattern of racketeering 
(1 8 USC §§ 1962(a), 1963: twenty- 
year maximum); conspiracy to en- 
gage in a pattern of racketeering (1 8 
USC §§  1962(d), 1963: twenty-year 
maximum); engaging in a continu- 
ing criminal enterprise (21 USC § 
848: ten-year mandatory minimum 
to life); use of a firearm in aid of 
drug trafficking (1 8 USC 5 924(c): 
five-year mandatory minimum; ten 
years if the weapon is a machine 
gun); use of juveniles (21 USC 5 
845(b): one-year minimum); drug 
trafficking by one previously con- 
victed of a similar drug offense (21 
USC §§  841 (b)(l)(A) and (B), (iii): 
ten-year mandatory minimum to 
life if 5 grams or more; twenty years 
to life if 50 grams or. more). 
Second, the mandatory sentenc- 
ing laws and Guidelines have pur- 
posely produced relative inflexibil- 
ity with respect to the sentence. 
Thus, once the prosecutor has de- 
cided on the charges, the judicial 
contribution, in many cases, can be 
almost ministerial. Since the pros- 
ecutor is  able to make a very pre- 
cise selection of the ultimate sen- 
tence, the judge's role is  simply to 
ratify the choice of sentence deter- 
mined by the prosecutor. 
Under this system the potential 
for sentencing disparities-pur- 
portedly the vice that the Guide- 
lines sought to eliminate-has 
merely been shifted from the prov- 
ince of the judge to that of the 
prosecutor. Indeed, by charging 
and bargaining in disparate ways 
with similarly situated defendants, 
the prosecutor is able to introduce 
as much sentencing disparity into 
the system as he or she chooses. 
Furthermore, although judge-made 
disparities are open to public scru- 
tiny, prosecutor-made disparities 
are decided in secret, without any 
public oversight. 
On the other hand, the Supreme 
Court observed in Mistretta that 
"the sentencing function long has 
been a peculiarly shared responsi- 
bility among the Branches of gov- 
ernment and has never been 
thought of as the exclusive consti- 
tutional province of any one 
Branch." (109 S Ct at 664.) More- 
over, Congress may, if it chooses, 
eliminate all discretion from sen- 
tencing and make every sentence 
mandatory. (Id at 650-51.) If Con- 
gress can remove all discretion, can 
it not guide that discretion through 
the Guidelines? (White, 869 F2d at 
825.) Furthermore, since there is  no 
constitutional right to individual- 
ized sentencing (Lockett V. Ohio, 
438 US 586, 602 (1978)), a defen- 
dant has no right to present miti- 
gating evidence to the sentencing 
authority (United States v. Huerta, 
878 F2d 89 (2d Cir 1989); United 
States v. Musser, 856 F2d 1484 (I  th 
Cir 1988); United States v. White, 
supra). Therefore, a defendant can- 
not complain if that evidence is 
regulated in the form provided by 
the Guidelines. Finally, according 
to some courts, the prosecutor's 
power is  not really as formidable as 
the due processclaim suggests. Said 
one court: "The only authority 
'delegated' by the rule is  the au- 
thority to move the district court for 
a reduction of sentence in cases in 
which the defendant has rendered 
substantial assistance. The author- 
ity to actually reduce a sentence 
remains vested in the district 
court." (Musser, 856 F2d at 1487.) 
Remedies for prosecutor's 
refusal to move for reduction 
The language of 18 U.S.C. § 
3553(e) and Guideline 5K1.1 re- 
quires a motion by the prosecutor 
before a court may reduce the de- 
fendant's sentence based on the 
defendant's cooperation. Most 
courts have construed this require- 
ment strictly: Without the trigger- 
ing motion by the prosecutor, a 
court may not consider the defen- 
dant's cooperation. (United States 
v. Rexach, 896 F2d 710 (2d Cir 
1990); United States v. Francois, 889 
F2d 1341 (4th Cir 1989); United 
States v. Weidner, 703 F Supp 1350 
(ND Ind 1988).) Some courts have 
Criminal Justice 
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construed this requirement more 
broadly to include a prosecutor's 
oral recommendation at the time of 
sentence (United States v. Camp- 
bell, 704 F Supp 661, 663 (ED Va 
1989)), or letters to the court de- 
tailing the defendant's cooperation 
(United States v. Coleman, 707 F 
Supp I 101 (WD Mo 1989)). Absent 
a downward departure motion by 
the prosecutor or its functional 
equivalent, what remedy is avail- 
able to a defendant who seeks a 
sentence reduction based on sub- 
stantial assistance? 
As noted above, some courts 
squarely hold that absent a motion, 
no remedy is  available regardless of 
the unreasonableness of the pros- 
ecutor's refusal. (See Rexach, Fran- 
cois, and Weidner, supra.) Con- 
siderable judicial deference is-and 
should be-accorded to prosecu- 
torial discretion, particularly in view 
of the prosecutor's expertise. 
However, a total withdrawal of the 
judicial function is potentially dan- 
gerous. Occasions may arise when 
prosecutorial discretion should be 
reviewable. For example, what if a 
defendant makes a colorable 
showing that the prosecutor's re- 
fusal to make a downward-depar- 
ture motion was based on racial or 
vindictive grounds? Surely judicial 
intervention in such a case would 
not only be appropriate, but would 
even be mandated. 
Some courts, while suggesting 
that prosecutorial discretion may be 
reviewable, refuse to consider 
claims of abuse by pointing out that 
the prosecutor already has exer- 
cised discretion through beneficial 
charging or plea bargaining deci- 
sions. For example, the prosecutor 
already may have selected a lesser 
charge from a wide variety of pos- 
sible charges with varying manda- 
tory minimums, or may have 
permitted a plea to an even fur- 
ther-reduced charge. A court 
therefore could conclude that the 
defendant already received the 
benefit of his or her cooperation 
during the charging and plea-bar- 
gaining phase of the case and is not 
entitled to any further prosecuto- 
rial lenity. (United States v. La- 
Cuardia, supra; United States v. 
lustice, 877 F2d 664 (8th Cir 1 989); 
United States v. Taylor, 868 F2d 125 
(5th Cir 1 989); United States v. Nel- 
son, 717 F Supp 682 (DC Minn 
1989).) 
Finally, some courts have held, 
for differing reasons, that in appro- 
priate cases a prosecutor's motion 
is  not a necessary precondition for 
a sentence reduction based on the 
defendant's cooperation. (lustice, 
White, and Roberts, supra.) In these 
instances, the courts provide a 
remedy either by finding the stat- 
ute and Guidelines unconstitution- 
al (United States v. Curran, 724 F 
Supp 1239 (CD 111 1989); Roberts, 
supra); by reading into the coop- 
eration agreement a downward- 
departure condition (Coleman, su- 
pra); by applying 18 U.S.C. 5 
3553(b), which allows for "an ag- 
gravating or mitigating circum- 
stance of a kind, or to a degree, not 
adequately taken into considera- 
tion by the Sentencing Commis- 
sion," to find as an aggravating 
circumstance prosecutorial bad 
faith (United States v. Bruno, 897 
F2d 691, 695 (3d Cir 1990); or by 
simply announcing that the provi- 
sions in the statute and Guidelines 
do not mean what they say Uustice 
and White, supra). 
Standard for evaluating 
prosecutorial discretion 
Assume that a prosecutor has 
made a decision not to move for a 
downward departure based on the 
defendant's cooperation. What 
standard should a court employ to 
determine whether the prosecutor 
acted in good faith? The only court 
to squarely address this important 
question has been the Second Cir- 
cuit in United States v. Rexach, 896 
F2d 710 (2d Cir 1990). In Rexach, 
the defendant was indicted for sell- 
ing three vials of cocaine to an un- 
dercover officer within 1,000 feet 
of a public elementary school, and 
for possessing with inteni to dis- 
tribute cocaine. (21 USC S S  812, 
841, and 845.) Rexach participated 
in a proffer session with an Assis- 
tant United States Attorney. 
A proffer session ordinarily oc- 
curs before any cooperation agree- 
ment is  reached. At the proffer ses- 
sion, a representative of the United 
States Attorney's Office, defense 
counsel, and the client meet to dis- 
cuss the kinds of assistance that the 
client might be able to render. An 
agreement is executed containing 
the understanding that no state- 
ments made at the proffer session 
may be used by the government 
against the client in any future 
prosecution, except in a prosecu- 
tion for false statements, obstruc- 
tion of justice, or perjury. Further- 
more, the government may use 
information derived directly or in- 
directly from the meeting to obtain 
evidence against the client and may 
also use statements made by the 
client for the purpose of cross-ex- 
amination, should the client testify. 
At the proffer session, Rexach 
provided detailed information that 
led to the arrests of three individ- 
uals. However, he provided no fur- 
ther information until one week 
before his trial, when he claimed 
that he could offer additional infor- 
mation about large-scale narcotics 
dealers and distributors. Based on 
these representations, the govern- 
ment entered into a cooperation 
agreement with Rexach which pro- 
vided that Rexach would cooper- 
ate fully, attend meetings, and 
testify for the government. The 
agreement further provided: 
If it is determined by this Office 
that Domingo Rexach has made 
a good faith effort to provide 
substantial assistance in the in- 
vestigation or prosecution of an- 
other person who has committed 
an offense, this Office will file a 
motion * * * pursuant to Title 18, 
United States Code, Section 
3553(e) so that the sentencing 
judge shall have the authority to 
impose a sentence below a level 
established by statute as a mini- 
mum sentence, and * * * pursuant 
to Section 5K1.1 of the Sentenc- 
ing Guidelines. (Rexach, 896 F2d 
at 71 2.) 
Pursuant to this agreement, Rex- 
ach pleaded guilty to distributing 
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cocaine. Before sentencing, the 
government informed Rexach that 
it would not move for a downward 
departure because it did not find 
that he had made a good-faith ef- 
fort to provide substantial assist- 
ance. Rexach's information, ac- 
cording to the government, was 
"unreliable and worthless." He of- 
fered no assistance in investigating 
the information, failed to stay in 
contact with the authorities, and 
dropped out of sight for significant 
periods of time. Claiming that the 
government had breached the 
agreement, Rexach moved for an 
order directing specific perform- 
ance. (Rexach also claimed that 
section 5K1.1 violated due process 
and the separation of powers doc- 
trine because it conditioned a 
downward departure on a prose- 
cutor's discretionary determination 
of substantial cooperation. The 
Second Circuit rejected those ar- 
guments in a subsequent decision, 
United States v. Huerta, supra.) 
The district judge denied the 
motion for specific performance, 
finding that the prosecutor had 
made a good-faith determination 
that Rexach had not provided sub- 
stantial assistance. (United States v. 
Rexach, 71 3 F Supp 126 (SD NY 
1989).) The district judge imposed 
a sentence of fourteen months' im- 
prisonment, midway in the guide- 
line range of twelve to sixteen 
months; a six-year period of super- 
vised release; and a special assess- 
ment of $50. A panel of the Second 
Circuit affirmed, with one judge 
dissenting. Recognizing that its re- 
cent decision in United States v. 
Huerta (supra) contained broad 
language suggesting that a prose- 
cutor's discretion in making down- 
ward-departure motions might be 
unlimited and unreviewable, the 
court sought to clarify the appro- 
priate standards governing a pros- 
ecutor's refusal to make such a 
motion. Specifically, should the test 
be whether the prosecutor subjec- 
tively believed that the defendant 
failed to provide substantial assist- 
ance, or should the prosecutor's 
subjective belief also be objective- 
ly reasonable? 
Initially, absent any cooperation 
agreement, the decision by a pros- 
ecutor to forgo a downward-de- 
parture motion "is not subject to 
judicial review at all." (Rexach, 896 
F2d at 713.) Thus, no matter how 
unreasonable or in bad faith the 
prosecutor's decision may be, ab- 
sent any cooperation agreement, 
there is  no judicially enforceable 
obligation to move for a downward 
departure, just as there is no judi- 
cially enforceable obligation on the 
prosecutor to engage in plea bar- 
gaining. However, when a coop- 
eration agreement is entered into, 
a court will review that agreement 
and the parties' obligations under 
it, pursuant to established princi- 
ples of contract law. (Santobello v. 
New York, 404 US 257 (1971); 
United States v. Carbone, 739 F2d 
45 (2d Cir 1984).) Thus, where the 
agreement is  conditioned on the 
satisfaction of the obligor-the 
prosecutor, in this case-the con- 
dition is not met if the obligor is  
honestly, even though unreasona- 
bly, dissatisfied. 
In Rexach the cooperation agree- 
ment left acceptance of the defen- 
dant's performance subject to the 
prosecutor's judgment; therefore, 
the prosecutor was allowed to re- 
ject the defendant's performance, 
provided the prosecutor was hon- 
estly dissatisfied. Indeed, observed 
the court, the Guidelines them- 
selves adopt a broad subjective 
standard for prosecutorial decision 
making. Under the Guidelines, the 
prosecutor decides whether to 
make a downward-departure mo- 
tion, what constitutes "substantial 
assistance," and how the court 
should evaluate that assistance. 
"For these reasons, the decision to 
make or withhold a motion for 
downward departure must be giv- 
en the same high level of defer- 
ence as other prosecutor deci- 
sions." (Rexach, 896 F2d at 71 3.) 
There are, the court noted, some 
limits on the prosecutor's exercise 
of discretion. First, there is an im- 
plied obligation of good faith in 
every contract (Restatement (Sec- 
ond) of Contracts S 205), as there 
is  in other areas of prosecutorial 
decision making. (United States v. 
Wayte, 470 US 598 (1 985); Black- 
ledge v. Perry, 41 7 US 2 1 (1 9741.1 
Although a prosecutor is presumed 
to act in good faith, this presump- 
tion can be rebutted by showing 
that the prosecutor acted invidi- 
ously, vindictively, or in bad faith. 
(id.) Second, a defendant could ne- 
gotiate a cooperation agreement 
that provided for a standard of sat- 
isfaction to be one of objective rea- 
sonableness. Finally, as a matter of 
policy, prosecutors would not be 
likely to misuse cooperation agree- 
ments and risk that as defendants 
came to distrust prosecutors, valu- 
able information would not be 
forthcoming. (See also United States 
v. lewis, 896 F2d 246, 249 (7th Cir 
1990); United States v. LaCuardia, 
902 F2d at 1 O f  6.) 
Judge Pierce, in dissent, did not 
disagree that the absence of a co- 
operation agreement precludes ju- 
dicial review, nor that agreements 
are reviewed under ordinary con- 
tract principles. He did disagree, 
however, with the application of 
those principles to this case-spe- 
cifically, the failure of either the 
majority or the district judge to de- 
termine whether the parties con- 
templated that Rexach's earlier co- 
operation pursuant to the proffer 
agreement would be included in 
the "substantial assistance" calcu- 
lation. Judge Pierce further noted 
that objective standards frequently 
are employed to interpret pGrform- 
ance promises in contracts. (See A. 
Corbin, Corbin on Contracts 5 150 
at 670 (1963).) Thus, applying an 
objective standard, Rexach's assist- 
ance-providing information lead- 
ing to three arrests-constituted 
"substantial assistance" within the 
meaning of the plea agreement. 
Judge Pierce would have remand- 
ed the case to the district court to 
determine whether the parties in- 
tended that Rexach's earlier assist- 
ance would be included within the 
"substantial assistance" calculus. 
The Second Circuit's broad def- 
erence to prosecutorial discretion 
under the Sentencing Guidelines is  
not surprising. The judiciary histor- 
(Continued on page 43) 
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ically has shown remarkable re- 
straint when reviewing prosecuto- 
rial decision making generally. (See 
Bennett Cershman, Prosecutorial 
Misconduct 5 4.1 (Clark Boardman 
1985).) Even so, as a practical mat- 
ter, reviewing prosecutorial discre- 
tion under a subjective bad-faith 
test is  meaningless. Cases that ap- 
ply a bad-faith standard to prose- 
cutorial behavior have rarely found 
against the prosecutor. (See B. 
Gershman, supra; United States v. 
Smitherman, 889 F2d 189, 191 (8th 
Cir 1989): threatening to intervene 
if prosecutor arbitrarily and in bad 
faith refuses to file a SKI .1 motion.) 
Rexach is a prime example of ar- 
guably bad-faith conduct by the 
prosecutor. Although Rexach pro- 
vided information leading to the 
drug arrests of three persons, the 
Second Circuit sustained the pros- 
ecutor's claim that the assistance 
was not substantial enough. Finally, 
the Second Circuit's confidence 
that institutional incentives guar- 
antee prosecutorial good faith may 
be fanciful. After Rexach, it is  prob- 
ably more likely that cooperating 
defendants will be reluctant to en- 
ter into cooperation agreements 
with prosecutors without much 
more meaningful assurances than 
simple reliance on the prosecutor's 
good faith. (3 
